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Atlantic Richfield Company v. Montana Second Judicial District
Court, 2017 MT 324, 390 Mont. 76, 408 P.3d 515 (Mont. Dec. 29,
2017)

Molly M. Kelly
Landowners in Opportunity, Montana sought restoration damages
from ARCO, Anaconda Copper Mining Company’s successor, to their
property from over a century of processing ore at the Anaconda Smelter.
ARCO argued that CERCLA preempted and barred any claim for
restoration damages. The Montana Supreme Court held: landowners could
bring their state common law claims seeking restoration damages; the state
district court had subject matter jurisdiction; and landowners’ proposed
restoration fund did not challenge EPA’s selected remedy under
CERCLA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Supreme Court accepted supervisory control over
Atlantic Richfield Company v. Montana Second Judicial District Court to
determine whether private property owners (“Property Owners”) in the
Anaconda Smelter Site (“Smelter Site”) could bring a claim for restoration
damages against Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) after the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) directed ARCO’s remediation
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”).1 The Montana Supreme Court found that the
Property Owners’ claims did not challenge EPA’s selected remedy,2 the
Property Owners were not CERCLA “potentially responsible parties”
(“PRPs”); 3 and the Property Owners’ claims did not conflict with
CERCLA and thus were not preempted.4
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1980, the Anaconda smelter, which had processed copper ore
from Butte for nearly one hundred years, shut down.5 Processing the
copper ore produced wastes of arsenic, copper, cadmium, lead, and zinc,
contaminating soil, groundwater, and surface water surrounding the
smelter.6 That same year, Congress passed CERCLA, also known as

1
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 2017 MT
324, ¶ 5, ___ P.3d ___, 2017 WL 66294510 (Mont. Dec. 29, 2017).
2.
Id. ¶ 20.
3.
Id. ¶ 24.
4.
Id. ¶ 27.
5.
Id. ¶ 2.
6.
Anaconda Co. Smelter Superfund Site, Background, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index.cfm?
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“Superfund”, which fosters the cleanup of sites with hazardous waste
contamination.7 The Smelter Site was declared a Superfund site in 1983.8
In 1984, Both ARCO and EPA were responsible for the Smelter Site
remediation.9 EPA chose a remedy for the Smelter Site remediation in
1998 and directed ARCO’s cleanup responsibilities.10
EPA required ARCO to remediate residential yards within the
Smelter Site with levels of arsenic in the soil greater than 250 parts per
million and further required remediation of all drinking water wells with
levels of more than ten parts per million of arsenic.11 Desiring full
restoration to pre-contamination levels, a group of ninety-eight
landowners, the Property Owners, in the Smelter Site obtained the opinion
of outside experts for restoration remedies.12 The outside experts
recommended removing the top two feet of soil and installing permeable
wells to remove arsenic from the groundwater.13 The outside experts’
recommended restoration remedies were in excess of EPA’s requirements
of ARCO for the cleanup.14
Property Owners brought four common law claims of trespass and
nuisance against ARCO in 2008.15 The fifth claim brought by the Property
owners was “expenses for and cost of investigation and restoration of real
property.”16 The restoration damages would be placed in a trust account
used to conduct restoration work.17
In 2013, ARCO moved for summary judgment on the Property
Owners’ claim for restoration damages, arguing that CERCLA preempted
the claim.18 Initially, the second judicial district court of Montana
dismissed the Property Owners’ case, finding that the statute of limitations
barred the claims.19 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed and held that
the statute of limitations did not bar the claims for nuisance and trespass
because they were ongoing and reasonably abatable.20
On remand, the district court denied all of ARCO’s motions for
summary judgment, including their motion for summary judgement on the
claim for restoration damages.21 ARCO petitioned the Court for a writ of
fuseaction=second.Cleanup&id=0800403#bkground (last visited March 6,
2018).
7.
Atl. Richfield Co., ¶ 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601–9675 (2012)).
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. ¶ 4.
16.
Id. ¶ 6.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. ¶ 5.
20.
Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2015 MT 255, ¶ 77, 380 Mont, 495,
358 P.3d 131.
21.
Atl. Richfield Co., ¶ 5.
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supervisory control, and the Court issued an order granting it.22 The writ
was specifically for the limited purpose of considering the district court’s
order denying summary judgment to ARCO regarding the restoration
damages claim, as well as the order granting the Property Owners’ motion
for summary judgement on ARCO’s CERCLA preemption affirmative
defenses.23
III. ANALYSIS
The Court noted that due to the limited purpose of the writ, it did not need
to decide the merits of the case, and ARCO was not precluded from
challenging the merits of the Plaintiff’s claims.24 As a matter of law,
ARCO argued that CERCLA precluded the Property Owners’ state law
restoration claims because they conflicted with EPA’s remedy.25 ARCO
argued that CERCLA barred recovery where: (1) the claims were a direct
challenge to EPA’s remedy and thus invalid under CERCLA’s timing of
review provision; (2) the Property Owners were PRPs; and (3) the claims
conflicted with CERCLA under the doctrine of conflict preemption.26
Preemption can occur expressly, or “impliedly through the
doctrines of field preemption or conflict preemption.”27 The Court found
there was no express or field preemption because CERCLA’s savings
clauses expressly allowed for state law claims.28
Property Owners relied on Sunburst School District Number Two
v. Texaco, where the plaintiffs brought a similar restoration damages claim
and Texaco argued that Montana’s Comprehensive Environmental
Cleanup and Responsibility Act (“CECRA”), which is similar to
CERCLA, preempted their claims.29 The Sunburst Court discussed
preemption and held that since there was no necessary implication for
conflict between the Department of Environmental Quality’s supervisory
role and the common law claim for restoration damages, there was no
preemption under Montana’s CECRA and the restoration damages were
appropriate.

22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
For instance, to recover restoration damages under state common law,
a party must show: “(1) the injury to the property is reasonably abatable, and
(2) the plaintiff has ‘reasons personal’ for seeking restoration damages.” Id.
¶ 8 (citing Lampi v. Speed, 2011 MT 231, ¶ 29, 362 Mont. 122, 261 P.3d
1000).
25.
Id. ¶ 9.
26.
Id. ¶ 10.
27.
Id. (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1591,
1594-05, 191 L.Ed.2d 511 (2015)).
28.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9652(d), § 9614(a) (2012)).
29.
Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 338
Mont. 259, 165 P.3d 1079.
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A. The Property Owners’ Claim Does Not Challenge EPA’s
Selected Remedy
Section 113(h) of CERCLA (“timing of review provision”)
describes the procedure for citizen challenges to EPA’s selected remedy
in restoration cases.30 The timing of review provision presents a
jurisdictional question regarding the state court’s subject matter
jurisdiction to hear state law claims involving CERCLA, as the statute
only references federal courts. However, the Court declined to address that
question because a dispositive and essential factor in the timing of review
provision is that the claim for restoration damages must “challenge” the
CERCLA cleanup.31
ARCO asserted the Property Owners’ claim challenged EPA’s
remediation.32 Recognizing it had not addressed what comprises a
challenge to CERCLA remediation under the timing of review provision,
the Court analyzed different circuits’ analyses of a “challenge” under
CERCLA.33 The Court concluded that a challenge “must actively interfere
with EPA’s work, as when the relief sought would stop, delay, or change
the work EPA is doing.”34 The Court stressed that the Property Owners
were not seeking to dictate EPA’s remediation, but instead were seeking
common law damages to complete their own restoration, independent of
EPA.35 Since the Court did not find that the Property Owners’ remediation
claims constituted a “challenge” under the timing of review provision,
Montana state courts are not preempted from exercising their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court found that there was no ongoing EPA remedial
action.36
B. Property Owners are Not Potentially Responsible Parties
Under CERCLA, a PRP is “prohibited from conducting any
remedial action that is inconsistent with EPA’s selected remedy without
EPA’s consent.”37 ARCO argued that the Property Owners were PRPs and
thus barred from remediation independent of EPA’s choice.38 The Court
found that while the Property Owners could potentially be treated as PRPs
had EPA or judiciary determined them so, the statute of limitations for
determining PRPs had long passed and “the PRP horse left the barn
decades ago.”39

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012).
Atl. Richfield Co., ¶¶ 12, 14.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶¶ 15-17 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 22 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) (2012)).
Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
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C. Property Owners’ Claim Does Not Conflict with CERCLA and is
Not Preempted
ARCO lastly argued that the claim for restoration damages was
otherwise in conflict with CERCLA in three ways.40 ARCO first argued
that EPA has exclusive discretion to choose remedies at CERCLA sites
and alternative remedies are preempted. The Court disagreed, reaffirming
CERCLA’s savings clauses that expressly “contemplate the applicability
of state law remedies.”41 Second, ARCO maintained that there was
“unambiguous congressional intent” to preempt state law remedies in
superfund remediation.42 The Court was not persuaded, again because it
found that the Property Owners’ claimed damages and planned
remediation did not challenge EPA’s remediation at the site, and did not
prevent EPA from accomplishing its goals at the Smelter Site.43 Finally,
ARCO asserted that any private remediation claims could not proceed
until EPA’s remediation was complete.44 The Court already found there
was no ongoing remediation and was not persuaded.45
Having established there was no ongoing remediation, that
CERCLA’s savings clauses expressly allowed for state law claims, and the
Property Owners’ claim did not challenge EPA’s remedy, the Court held:
“CERCLA does not expressly or impliedly preempt the Property Owners’
claim for restoration damages. . . .”46
IV. CONCURRENCE
Justice Baker specially concurred, noting the decision was a
“narrow one. . . .”47 The Concurrence discussed how CERCLA sets a floor
for remediation, not a ceiling.48 Furthermore, the Concurrence noted:
“[t]he dynamic between individual restoration and CERCLA’s
coordinated large-scale response does not give rise to preemption as a
matter of law.”49 The Concurrence discussed future issues for trial,
separately adding if ARCO maintains that the proposed remedy conflicts
with measures already taken to remediate the site, ARCO may address
those conflicts while rebutting the essential elements in a state restoration
damages claim.50 However, ARCO cannot “cloak itself” in the federal
government’s authority, meaning ARCO cannot assert that because it

40.
Id. ¶ 27.
41.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(a), 9652(d) (2012)).
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. ¶ 18.
46.
Id. ¶ 27.
47.
Id. ¶ 31 (Baker, J., concurring).
48.
Id. ¶ 33 (citing New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1246
(10th Cir. 2006)).
49.
Id. ¶ 33.
50.
Id. ¶ 36.
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complied with EPA remediation, the company does not need to do any
additional remediation.51
IV. DISSENT
The dissent characterized the majority’s conclusion as “not only
inconsistent with CERCLA and federal precedent, but as having no
authority in Montana law.”52 Fundamentally, the dissent disagreed with
the majority’s holding that the Property Owners’ claim was not a
“challenge” to EPA’s remedy53 and that the remediation was not
ongoing.54
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the rights of private
property owners in superfund areas to bring restoration claims against the
PRP. The Court drew a line between acceptable monetary restoration
damages versus compelling EPA to conduct said restoration. Finding no
challenge to EPA restoration plans, the timing of preview provision did
not apply, there was no CERCLA preemption for restoration claims, and
state common law restoration claims could be sought from ARCO.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. ¶ 37 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 51.

